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ABSTRACT
Issues related to the reliability of a redundant system with large main memory are
addressed in this report. The Fault-Tolerant Processor (FTP) for the Advanced Launch
System (ALS) is used as a basis for our presentation. When the system is free of latent faults,
the probability of system crash due to multiple channel faults is shown to be insignificant
even when the outputs of computing channels are infrequently voted on. Using channel error
maskers (CEMs) is shown to improve reliability more effectively than increasing redundancy
or the number of channels for applications with long mission times.
Even without using a voter, most memory errors can be immediately corrected by those
CEMs implemented with conventional coding techniques. In addition to their ability to
enhance system reliability, CEMs m with a very low hardware overhead -- can be used to
dramatically reduce not only the need of memory re-alignment, but also the time required
to re-align channel memories in case, albeit rare, such a need arises. Using CEMs, we
have developed two different schemes to solve the memory re-alignment problem. In both
schemes, most errors are corrected by CEMs, and the remaining errors are masked by a
voter.
Index Terms- Access sets, active agent, Fault-Tolerant Processor (FTP), fault register,
latent errors, channel error maskers (CEMs), random access memory, recovery page, relia-
bility, single channel fault model, voting.
i.e., it takes several steps to vote on a message/data, each step taking approximately 5
#seconds, when compared to the instruction cycles of contemporary microprocessors. This
in turn implies that FTP's channel outputs should not be voted on frequently. As embedded
systems are becoming increasingly complex, one must carefully investigate the dynamics of
system failure for life-critical applications with long mission times.
The first important problem to be addressed in this report is the probability of system
f_lure due to multiple channel faults in FTP. By developing a realistic system model,
we shall first show this probability to be negligible. Then, we analyze the probability of
resource exhaustion as a result of failures for appUcations with long mission times. A serious
drawback of low-speed (slack) voters is that when channels have large main memory, it is
very time-consuming to re-align all channels with a slack voter into an identical state.
To alleviate the difficulty associated with memory re-alignment, a monitoring technique
using signature analysis was proposed in [3]. In this method, main memory is decomposed
into signature pages, and memory accesses to each page are encoded into a signature which
is then stored in an independent signature memory. A fault is thus detectable only when
a faulty word is accessed. Upon detection of a fault in main memory, only those pages
with different signatures need to be re-aligned. The signature analysis cannot completely
overcome the memory reoaUgnment problem, because even though a massive redundant
system may have congruent inputs, errors caused by random permanent/transient faults
that occur in memory cells cannot be detected by this technique. Thus, in the worst case,
the whole main memory must be realigned when such faults occur.
Channel failure rate has the most pronounced effects on system reliability, because it (i)
determines when a resource exhaustion occurs, and (ii) affects the process of fault detection,
fault location, and reconfiguration. When channel failure rate is high, the success of a
mission will be greatly affected by the quality of fault handling processes. On the other
hand, when channel failure rate is low, rare occurrences of faults will lower the demand on
PAGE____ INTENTIONALLYBLAN_
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
system resources-- such as hardware, computing time, and software routines-- forfault
handling.System designwould thus be greatlysimplifiedifthe channel failureratecan be
effectivelyreduced.
As a solutiontoboth the reliabilityenhancement and memory re-alignmentproblems,we
propose to use channel error maskers (CEMs). The main motiwtion behind this proposal
is to make channels more reliable by masking and/or ccorrecting channel faults with CEMs.
When the reliability of each channel is improved, the need of memory re-alignment can be
reduced significantly. It is shown that the reliability of ALS is dramatically improved when
the CEMs for main memory are implemented with common single error correction/double
error detection (SEC/DED) codes. Furthermore, using CEMs can speed up the memory re-
alignment process substantially, because only those faulty words uncovered by CEMs need
to be re-aligned by the voter. Two different schemes, called Scherne_l and Scheme-2, axe
developed for the re-alignment of channel's main memory. In Scheme_l, main memory is
decomposed into recovery pages, and a page is re-M_gned only when CEMs cannot recover it.
An optimization technique is developed to determine the optimal page size for Scheme_l.
In Scheme..2, the addresses of faulty memory words are recorded, and only those recorded
faulty words need to be re-aligned.
In order to assess FTP's capability for the ALS mission, the basic operational principles
of FTP axe first introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, we develop a reliability model which
is then used to evaluate FTP's reliability for ALS. CEMs are then applied to solve the
memory re-alignment problem in Section 4. The report concludes with a few remarks in
Section 5.
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2 Review of FTP Architecture
The FTP architecture,and the memory accessmodel forthe analysisofmultiplechannel
faults,are introduced in thissection.An FTP channel may have one or two processors.
When two processorsare builtintoeach channel,one processorisdedicatedto computation
functionsand the other to I/O functions.The two processorsin a channel communicate
with each other by writing and reading messages in shared memory. There are interval
timers and watchdog timers in each channel for task schedulingand time-out interrupts,
respectively.
FTP can providehigh performance, and itsarchitecturecan be in the form of simplex,
duplex,triplex(TMR), or quadruplex (QMR). In a redundant FTP system, only clocksin
the differentchannels of FTP are tightlysynchronized,and thus, fault-freechannels can
execute identicalinstructionsin lock-step. Channels communicate with each other via a
network formed by the communicators in redundant channels.
A block diagram of the communicator network in a QMR FTP isgiven in Fig. 1 where
a communicator iscomposed of a setof registers,a transmitter(singleinput,N outputs),
interstage(singleinput,N outputs),and a receiver(N inputs,singleoutput). There are
four channels,calledchannel A, B, C and D, respectively.The setofregistersXv, XR, XE,
and Xy in channel Y, Y E {A,B,C,D}, store inputs and outputs of channel Y to/from
the communicator network.
Logically,channels exchange data by reading/writingdata from/to the set of regis-
tersin the communicator. Data communications between channels are classifiedas voted
data-ezchange,and simplez data-ezchange.FTP designemphasizes the concept of source
congruency: foralltypes of data-exchanges,allcorrectlyoperatingchannels willeventually
receiveidenticalcopiesof data. A voted data-exchange allowschannels to compare their
outputs and mask any errorwhenever possible.A voted data-exchange isaccomplished by
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writing a value to Xv, and then reading the voted result from XR. Register XE in each
channel records any discrepancy between its Xv and XR values. The actual steps in a voted
data-exchange are that (1) every channel sends a message to its transmitter which will then
relay the message to its own interstage, and (2) through the fully-connected network from
N interstages to N receivers, the receiver in every channel gets a voted message and stores
it in XR.
A simplex data-exchange can be used by a channel to broadcast messages to the other
channels. For example, ifa message needs to be transferred from channel A to the others, all
channels execute an instruction "write message _ to XA'. When the instruction "write
to XA" is executed by channel A, • will be broadcast via the transmitters to a11 interstages.
In the meantime, the pseudo-messages _ sent by channels B, C and D are discarded by the
communicator network. After all interstages receive replicated copies of 4, • is broadcast
on the interstage network, and every receiver will have the voted _ stored in XR's. Through
such an exchange process, data congruency is guaranteed for both voted and simplex data-
exchanges.
3 Reliability Analysis
To justify the use of a single fault model, the probability of multiple channel faults will
first be shown to be negligibly small. Then, using this single fault model, the reliability
impact of CEMs on the ALS will be analyzed.
3.1 Probability of Multiple Channel Faults
A complete reliability model of FTP must include both single channel and multiple
channel faults. However, incorporation of multiple channel faults into the reliability model
will make the analysis very complex, because it deals with a multivariate distribution. To
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alleviatethe complexity,calculationof theprobabilityof multiplechannelfaultsis separated
from that of the probability of systemcrashcausedby resourcedepletion.
Sincea channel's operation depends heavily on its access to main memory, a memory
access model needs to be developed for the evaluation of multiple channel faults. The
existence of memory access locality has long been the key to the modeling of memory
access behavior. That is, once a program starts to access a specific memory area, it tends
to access the area continuously for a certain period. Thus, although memory cells are
physically identical, different parts of main memory must be distinguished when they have
different logical uses.
Using memory access locality, a program's memory access behavior can be modeled by
an active agent visiting main memory and forming access sets [4]. An access set is defined
as a memory area that is continuously accessed for a certain period of time during each visit.
We further assume that (1) locations of each access set in the system does not change during
the time of interest, (2) the number of access sets in the system is fixed, and (3) all access
sets have the same size u and are disjoint with one another. Based on these assumptions,
an access set can be used to denote a set of "physical" memory cells in a certain area.
Let Vj denote the event of the agent's j-th visit to AS i and M_ E _+ U {0) be the Vji's
lifetime, where (AS 1, AS 2... AS 'n} are m access sets in main memory. M_'s are assumed
to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables, and the agent's
present and future visits are independent of its past visits. Based on this memory access
model, a multiple channel fault occurs when more than one agent (i.e., channel processor)
either become faulty or visit faulty access sets during one inter-voting period.
To calculate the probability of multiple channel fanlts, it is assumed that memory is
initially free of faults and is not re-aligned when the voter can mask faulty channel outputs.
Voters are assumed to be the only fault detection/masking mechanism in the system. Once
the processor enters an access set, any of the faults in the processor, voter, or the access
7
set will causea faulty output on the channel. Note that faults in one accessset do not
propagateto anotheraccess set. For convenience of presentation, all processor and voter
faults are classified as access set faults. Since the interval between two successive component
failures is very large as compared to memory access times, a large number of access sets
will be visited between two successive fault occurrences, and no new fault is likely to occur
in an access set while it is being visited. Faults occur independently according to a Poisson
process.
A system with m access sets is said to be in state i when the agent is visiting AS _. Let
=q_ be the time V_ begins -- the agent's k-th visit to access set AS i -- and let Ni(t) = sup
(k [ S_ <_ t}, Ni(t) E I + U {0),Vi, t. For a given time interval [0,t), t > 0, the total number
of visits made by the agent to access sets is N(t) __ _ Nk(t). One or more access sets
k----1
may have been visited before the channels vote on their outputs. Let the random variable
X_ E I + U {0} denote the number of faults occurred in AS j during the agent's i-th visit (to
some access set). Since faults occur uniformly within memory and X_'s are assumed to be
i.i.d., X_'s will be represented by a single random variable X. Thus, at any time instant,
the agent's decision on which access set to visit makes no difference. Let _ = Ti - Ti-1
where _ is the time of the j-th voting on channel outputs. When _'s are i.i.d., they can
be represented by a single random variable Y.
Assuming that the agent has visited l access sets during [0, _-1), at time T_+_I there are
tX faults in AS i. In an NMR system, let Pc(_) be the probability of a channel generating
a faulty output during the time interval [Tj_I,Tj). During [0,Ti) , the total probability of
system crash due to multiple channel faults becomes
PIv(Tj) = _ Pr(no crash before Tk_x)(P¢(Yk))i(1 - Pc(Yk)) lv-i (3.1)
k=1 i=r_l
To evaluate Pc(I_), within [Tj-I,Tj) the probability of a faulty output generated by a
channel is
Pc(l'_lwvisitsbetween two successivevotings) = i- (e(x = o))"
- 1 - e -wuAY
wuAY (3.3)
where u and A are the size of access set and the failure rate of a memory word, respectively.
When w = 1, i.e., channels vote on their results after accessing each access set, Eq. (3.2)
i=r l
can be simplified as
3.2 Analysis of ALS
In this subsection, the probability of system crash due to multiple channel faults and
the effectiveness of CEMs are discussed using the ALS mission scenario. The ALS will first
sit on the launching pad for a week, and will then be in the boost phase for 10 minutes. Any
approval for launch requires the system to have fault masking capability. The system must
have 0.95 probability of availability, 0.98 probability of mission success, and less than 10 -s
system unreliability at the end of mission. Since information on the maintenance schedule
and the requirement for mission success are not available, we will focus on system reliability
and the probability of system possessing fault masking capability before launch.
The parameters necessary to estimate the reliability of ALS axe derived from the results
of the Entry Research Vehicle (ERV) study. Permanent failure rates of the processors
(including control circuits) and the interstage are predicted to be Ap = 8.91 x 10-S/hour,
and Ai = 1 x 10-6/hour, respectively [5]. Permanent failure rates of 64K x 4 RAM chips and
128K x 8 ROM chips are predicted to be 6 x 10-6/hour, and 2.8 x 10-S/hour, respectively.
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A redundant FTP equipped with IM bytes ofROM and RAM in each channel isconsidered
as an example ALS controller.Thus, the main memory needs 32 (8) RAM (ROM) chips,
and the totalfailurerateofRAM (ROM) isAm - 192 × 10-6/hour (Ao --20.8× 10-e/hour).
Note that the above failurerateshave been adjustedby theenvironment and qualityfactors,
II_ and IIq, i.e., Az = IIAx, where x E {p,i,o,m), and II = IIeIIq. Since IIq - 0.5 and
II_ = 3 in the ERV study, the actual component failure rates are An = 5.94 × 10-e/hour,
Ao = 13.86 × 10-S/hour, Ai = 1 × 10-S/hour, and A,_ = 128 × 10-e/hour, respectively. With
these parameter values, one can see that in the ALS, 96% of the channel faults axe caused
by main memory faults. This can be broken down to 86.8% of the faults due to RAM and
9.2% due to ROM.
The system cycle of FTP is 40 reset, within which all the essential control functions,
including fault recovery processes, must be completed for the system to function acceptably.
It takes about 11 pseconds to vote on one memory word -- the processor reads a memory
word, votes on it, reads the result back from the voter, and then writes the voted word back
to the memory. Because of the relatively low system failure rate and the frequent memory
scrubbing, it is reasonable to assume that the system is free of latent faults.
Note that when a fault occurs in the access set that is currently being visited by the
agent, the fault cannot be detected/corrected by the scrubbing process, because the scrub-
bing process is given the lowest priority. In the FTP, computing channels vote on their
outputs at least once every 40 rnseconds, i.e., Ti - Ti-1 < 40 mseconds. Thus, given that
no fault occurs before Ti-1, and _ ,_ Aa, where Aa is the failure rate of an access
set (including processor, interstage, memory and the access set itself), the probability of
system crash due to multiple channel faults in an NMR system during Yi = [Ti,Ti-1) is
Po(I, ) = j
J=r 1
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is
_, _ e-N_'"_-'(A,,Y) j.
J=r l
(3.5)
For example, within [0, t), the total probability of system crash due to two channel errors
<
< t6YA_. (3.7)
In Eq. (3.7),the probabilitythat the system does not crash beforet isnot considered,
and O(h) is the probabilityof 3 or more channels becoming faultysimultaneously.The
probabilityof system crash due to multiplechannel faultsin the FTP isplottedin Fig.2.
This probabilityisshown to be very smalleven when the the sizeof accesssetisvery large.
After the probabilityof multiplechannelfaultsisevaluated,a continuous-timeMarkov
model can be developed forthe reliabilityanalysisof a QMR system due to resourceexhaus-
tion.As shown in Fig.3, statesA, B, C, D and E are used to denote the conditionswhere
the system has four, three, two, one fault-free channels, and system crash, respectively. The
model can be modified for a TMR system with state A removed. In this model, At (Ah)
is the failure rate of transient (hard) faults, c is the recovery coverage of transient faults,
and cd is the reconfiguration coverage of a duplex configuration. Assuming that a channel
will be retired if any of its components becomes faulty, the total failure rate of a channel is
Ac = Ap + Am + Ao + Ai. (See Appendix A for definitions of A's).
A similar, but more complicated, FTP reliability model has been developed by CSDL
[5]. In the CSDL's model, every component failure is considered to be an independent event,
and the system reconfiguration time is treated as a random variable with an exponential
distribution. Our model differs from the CSDL's in that (1) system states are defined
by the number of fault-free channels, (2) different component failures in one channel are
aggregated into one single event, because when component failures are memoryless, and
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reconfiguration rates for different component failures are the same, the channel failure rate
is the sum of component failure rates, and (3) system reconfiguration is considered to
be done instantaneously, because it is usually done in one system cycle, 40 mseconds, or
9000/hour, which is extremely fast relative to faults' inter-arriwal times.
Next, we want to evaluate the effectiveness of CEMs. A channel with embedded CEMs
will be retired if CEMs become faulty. Thus, the channel failure rate becomes Xe = X_ +
Xc + xCo+ Xc + (1-cv)X v + (1-cl)Xi-I-(1- Co)Ao-I-(1- c,,,)X,,_, where %,ci,Co, and c,,
Ix ,o o oXi , X , X,,_) are the coverage (failure rate) of CEMs for processors, interstage, ROM
and RAM, respectively.
As mentioned earlier, 96% of channel failures are due to main memory failures. Thus,
adding CEMs to main memory can dramatically reduce the channel failure rate. On the
other hand, CEMs could be designed for processors (and control circuits), but this is more
difficult and has little impact on system reliability, since only 4% of channel failures result
from this portion of hardware. Consequently, the design of CEMs for processors will not
be considered any further. Note that CEMs would be inefficient if they could not achieve
high fault coverage during the mission. Assuming that CEMs for memory can correct w
bit-errors in an n-blt word, and faults in memory bits are independent of each other, one
can derive the coverage of CEMs at time t as:
n -i,_t i -a-r-i)_t
cm(Co)= E_'=,(i)(1-e - )e - (3.8)
i -- e -)_t
where X is the failure rate of a memory word. For the FTP example, if we use 7 extra
bits to encode a 32-bit data word by SEC/DED codes, we get X = _ × 10-9/hour-word,
and c,, _ Co _. 1 - 2 x 10 -r at t = 200 hours. However, when multiple-bit chips are
used, other coding schemes should be employed, such as those in [6], to provide high fault
coverage. Since the implementation of CEMs for main memory is straightforward with
standard commercial error controllers (e.g., 74ALS632B), they will not be discussed any
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further in this report.
Evaluationof the reliability of a redundant system with CEMs is very simple when
the system has perfect reconfiguration capability. For example, consider two redundant
systems with N and W computing channels, respectively. CEMs are embedded into the
NMR system, denoted as NMR_CEM, but no CEM is embedded into the WMR system. Let
the channel failure rate of NMR-CEM (WMR) be A_c(At), and N _< W, then the probability
of NMP,_CEM (WHIR) crash before time t is PN(t) = (1 - e-_'t) N (Pw(t) = (1 - e-_t)w).
When At _ 1 (A_t _: 1), PN(t) _, (Art) N (Pw(t) _ (At)w). Thus, an NMR_CEM is more
a WMR system when A_ < A N(V/_)W-N. Note, however, that a numericalreliable than
method is usually called for when systems do not have perfect reconfiguration capability.
Using the component failure rates predicted by the ERV study, numerical solutions of
the AL$ reliability with and without CEMs are calculated with METASAN [7]. Let the
failure rate of CEMs for memory be the same as that of an interstage, the coverage of
transient faults be 1.0, and the coverage of duplex system be 0.9, i.e., cv = c_ = O, A_ = Ai,
c = 1.0, and ca = 0.9. The probability of system crash while sitting on the launch pad for
TMR and QMR systems with and without CEMs are plotted in Figs. 4 and 5. The two
diagrams in Fig. 4 (5) show the reliability impacts of CEMs when II = 0.1 and II = 1,
respectively, where II is a adjusting factor of channel failure rate. In Fig. 4, SEC/DED
codes are embedded into RAM only, and in Fig. 5, SEC/DED codes are embedded into
both ROM and RAM. Clearly, a TMR system with the entire memory (ROM and RAM)
encoded is more reliable than a conventional QMR system even for very short missions
and very low component failure rates. Furthermore, while the reliability improvement by
changing from a conventional TMR to a QMR system is in the order of 10 to 100, when
CEMs are embedded into main memory, the reliability improvement by upgrading a system
from TMR..CEM to QMR_CEM is in the order of 103 to 104.
1METASAN is a registered trademark of the Industrial Technology Institute.
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The probability of FTP retaining fault masking capability for the ALS is examined
next. As shown in Fig. 6, the probability that a conventional QMR system retaining fault
masking capability decreases quickly with increases in H (i.e., component failure rates) and
launch waiting times. On the other hand, since channels in TMIL.CEM or QM1L.CEM axe
inherently reliable, the probability of lannch approval increases substantially even for very
long waiting times.
Finally, the total system reliability throughout the mission can be derived as follows.
The system unreliability is the sum of the probability of system crash before lannch, and the
probability of system crash during the lannch. Since the system cannot be launched unless
the FTP retains fault masking capability, we can calculate the probability of system crash
during the boost period conditioned on that the FTP has fault masking capability. When
the boost time is less than 20 minutes, the probability of system crash during the lannch is
lower than 10 -_ for systems without CEMs, and the figures are much lower for systems with
CEMs. Thus, the probability of system crash during the on-pad waiting period is much
higher than the probability of system crash during the boost phase.
4 Memory Re-alignment
Application of CEMs to the memory re-alignment problem is the subject of this section.
In a conventional QMR system, the probability that the channels need to be re-aligned is
Pr(t) = 1 - e -4_tt, where ),t is the transient failure rate of RAM. When At = 128 x 10 -5, we
get Pr(200) _ 0.64, implying that memory faults should be a serious threat to any system
design.
Theoretically, when a transient fault occurs in memory, the fault can be corrected by
memory re-alignment. However, since it is very time-consuming to re-align channel mem-
ories, and since it is difficult to discriminate permanent, intermittent, and transient faults
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in a limited amount of time, it is highly desirable to correct faults, if possible, by CEMs
without using memory re-alignment. For example, when SEC/DED codes are embedded
into main memory, the transient failure rate is reduced by a factor of 2 x 10 -_. Plugging the
new failure rate into P_(t), we get P_(200) _ 2 x 10 -_. Thus, for the ALS mission scenario,
channels' main memory re-allgnment is unlikely to be called for when CEMs are embedded
into main memory.
In addition to dramatically reducing the need of memory re-alignment, the fault-masking
capability of CEMs can be used to speed up the process of memory re-allgnment substan-
tiaily. Two schemes, called Scheme_l and Scheme_2, are developed for the re-allgnment
of main memory. In Scheme_l, the entire memory space of W words is decomposed into
K recovery pages, 121,f_2,...12K, where Ift_[ = _,i _ K. When the system decides to
start memory re-alignment, all channels scan through main memory page-by-page. After
each page of different channels is scanned, channels have the scanned page re-aligned if
any one of them is found to be faulty. The procedure is repeated until the entire memory
system is completely scanned and/or re-aligned. When two pages have different sizes, we
can repeatedly subtract 1 byte from the page of larger size, and add 1 byte to the other
until the difference of their page size is less than, or equal to, 1. Thus, when _ is not an
integer, there is at most one byte difference among pages. Since the reliability difference
and re-alignment overhead caused by the one-byte difference in page size is negligible, it is
assumed that/f can always divide W without leaving a non-zero remainder.
In Scheme_2, the entire memory is decomposed into 121 and ft2, where f_l is a fault
register of variable size, and f_2 is the rest of main memory. When main memory needs to
be re-aligned, the CPU in each channel scans through its main memory and places addresses
of faulty words into its fault register. After all channels complete their memory scan, they
use simplex data-exchanges to broadcast addresses of faulty words, and then vote on each
faulty word using the voted data-exchange.
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Detailsof Scheme_l and Scheme_2 are described in pseudo codes as follows.
Scheme_1(channel-i)
begin
Synchronize channels to start the re-Mignment
n=l;
while ( n < K ) /*scan recovery pages, where K is the number of pages*/
do
A=_fault-free';/*The current page is assumed to be fault-free */
scan f_n;
if (_,_ faulty & cannot be corrected by CEMs) A= "faulty" ;
write A to Xv;
if (XR- "faulty" or XE _ 0 )/*at least one cha_nel has a faulty page */
do /*realign _,_*/
j=l;
while (j _ _)
do write _n(j) to Xv;
write XR to _n(j);
j=j+l;
end_do
end_do
end_do
end
Scheme_2(cha,nnel_i)
begin
Synchronize channels to start the re-Mignment
j=l;
k=l;
while ( j < W ) /*scan main memory, where W is the total memory size*/
do
read M(j); /*read the j-th word*/
if (M(j) faulty & cannot be corrected by CEMs)
do
write j to f/l(k); /*find a faulty word, and record its address in the fault register */
k=k+l;
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end_do
end_do
write "EOF" to _l(k); /*channel_/finishes scanning */
write "Ready" to Xv;
while (XE _ zero) write "Ready" to Xv; /*wait until all channels finish scanning*/
for n=A to D /* re-align faulty words one by one, starting from channel A to D*/
k=l;/* pointer of channel n */
while (XR _"EOF')
do
write ill(k) to X,_; /*only channelon can make a simplex data-exchange
other channels' write commands will be ignored by the system */
read XR; /*every channel reads the address of the faulty word in channel_n*/
if (XR # "EOF')
do
T = XR; /*XR contains the address of the faulty word*/
write M(T) to Xv;/*channels vote on the faulty word*/
write XR to M(T); /*channels write the voted result back*/
end_do
k=k+l;
end_do
end
Scheme_l is more robust than Scheme_2, because in Scheme_l all channels are
executing identical instructions in lock step, and any mismatch between channels can be
easily detected. Thus, fanlt-free channels can always complete memory re-alignment without
being affected by faulty channels. On the other hand, Scheme_2 is faster but more prone
to errors, because the completion of memory re-alignment can be guaranteed only when
faulty channels can correctly interact with fault-free channels. For example, if the CPU
program counter in one channel stops at a certain point, all the other channels running
Scheme_2 will be stuck in waiting loops. Although this problem can be easily fixed by
adding a time-out to each waiting loop, Scheme_2 needs a substantial modification to
make it robust.
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Both Scheme_l and Scheme_2 induce a fixedtime overhead, Wtm, to scan main
memory, where t,_isthe memory cycletime. (Due to itsunimportance to the optimization
problem tobe discussed,thisfixedoverhead willnot be mentioned inthe restofthissection.)
The performance overhead of Scherne_2 islinearlyproportionalto the totalnumber of
faults,whereas Scherne_l may be substantiallyslowerthan Scheme_2, i.e.,Scheme_l is
fasterthan Scheme_2 only when g > K + m_, where g isthe totalnumber of faults,and
m isthe number of realigned recoverypages,because the valueof K in Scheme_l can be
greaterthan the value ofg in Scherne_2.
The speed ofScheme_l isprimarilydetermined by the sizeofrecoverypage and system
reliability.Denote the number of recoverypages to be realigned by a random variableF,
0 < F _<K. Then, the memory re-alignmenttime is
W
t,a = (K + F-_)t.,
where tv is the time to take a vote, i.e., the total time to write Xv, and read Xn and
XE. From Eq. (3.8) it is not difficult to see that the perfect fault detection assumption is
reasonable even when the channel failure rate is high and CEMs have only fault detection
capability, e.g., even/odd parity codes. When CEMs have only perfect detection capability,
the probability of f faulty recovery pages having occurred in the system by time t is PK(F =
f) = (If)R_lr-l)(t)(1 - Rp(t)) f, where 1 - P,_(t)is the probability that one or more of the
recovery pages which are in different channels but have the same page number are faulty.
Let A and q denote the failure rate of a memory word and the number of redundant channels,
respectively, then R_(t) = e-q_ At. Let ¢ = WqAt, and K have been determined, then the
conditional probability of f recovery pages needing to be realigned is
W _ -e-_) I (4.1)PK(tra) = P(tra = g + f_-Imemory is faulty)= (-)e-#'(1-_)(1
(1- e-C)
The objective of recovery page design is to minimize the re-alignment overhead so that
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at time t, the probability of re-alignment requiring more than a time period T is less than
e. Therefore, a solution K is feasible when PK(tra > T) < e. The optimization problem is
essentially a non-linear integer programming problem, and can be stated formally as follows:
min
subject to
z(t) = K +
K E I+,K < W
Ph'(t.. = K + f_)= (_')e-¢0-_)(1- e--'_K)II(1-e -¢)
PK(G. > T) < _.
When T >_ Wt_, the recovery page design is trivial, because the memory can be easily
re-aligned by voting on every word. When T < Wt,,, and the recovery coverage of CEMs
is c, no solution can be found if the optimal page size based on the given c is not feasible.
Since the coverage of CEMs is very high, the design problem can be focused on page size
optimization, while the feasibility problem can be easily solved by an exhaustive search.
When K* _;_ 1, an exhaustive search for K* is the only course to take. On the other hand,
when K* :_ 1, it will be shown that K* can be found through a conventional continuous
variable optimization technique.
Lemma 1 Given ¢ and K, PK(F = f), the probability off faults simultaneously occurring
to the system, is a monotonically decreasing function of .f when -_-iL1(e_ - 1) < 1, 1 < f _<
K. The sufficient condition for PK(F = f) to be a monotonically decreasing function of f
is(e - 1)< g > 1.
PK{F=f+I)
Proof." Since PK(F = f) >_ O, PK(F = f) is monotonically decreasing if PK(F=]) < 1,
Vf. Using Eq. (4.1), we have PKfF=I+I} = _(e_" -- 1), or PK(F = f) is monotonicallyPK(F=])
decreasing if K-/, .t 1) < 1. Note that 0 _< (e_ 1) _< 1 when _ _< 0.693. Sincef+1 (eK -
K-(]+I)
-_I -< (I+I)+I' and the maximum value of _ is/_t, K > 1,the sufficientcondition
for the ratio test to hold is (e_ - 1) < _:i-1, K > 1.
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Lemma 2 When the sufficient condition of Lemma 1 holds, P(tr_ > K +/_) < PK(F -
f) _ where/z! = _-_:(e_ - I).
I--_1 '
Proof: When the sufficient condition of Lemma 1 holds, PK(F - f + 1)/PK(F - f) <
K
/z!< I. Sincep/</_/+,,Vf, we have _PK(F=i) < PK(F= f)(l+pi+p}'"+p_-/),
i=!
--1-_ ¢-1+' I
or P(t, > K + < PK(F = 1) •
Note that ¢ ,_ K holds for most realistic parameter values. When Lemma 1 holds, and
K and _ are given, fk = inffi, such that P(tra > K + fi W) < E,Vi, can be determined
by applying Lemma 2 repeatedly. The next lemma states a key condition that can greatly
simplify the optimization algorithm.
Lemma 3 If KI(Kz) :_ 1, KI(K2) :_ ¢, and KI(K2) >> f, then PK,(F = f) _-, PK2(F =
f), where Pg_(f) is the probability of F = f when the number of recovery pages is Ki.
Proof: PK(F = f)= (_)e-_'(1-_)(1- e'_)!. When K :_ f, (_) _//_.,J, and e -_(1-_)
e -'/'. Furthermore, when g > ¢, we get 1 - e'r_ _ 1 - (1 - K_) = _. Combining the
above expressions leads to PK(F = f) ,_, -'_,.e-'l'(_) 1, or PK(F = f) _ e-¢_(. That is,
PK(F = f) is predominately determined by f, and is insensitive to K. Thus, PKI(F =
f) _ Pg, (F = f) holds. 1
Lemma 3 is valid for a broad range of K values, and when K1,K2 :_ 1, Ph'_(F = f)'s
are very close to each other. When Lemma 1 holds, PKa(F = fl) < PK2(F = f2), where
fl > f2. PK(F = f)'s with different K values are plotted in Fig. 7. In these examples,
the system has W = 4M words of memory, q = 4 channels, A = 0.75 byte/109 hours,
and t = 150 hours. Thus, ¢ = AtqW = 1.8, ]Psoo(F = 1) - P_3soo(F = 1)] < 0.05, and
IPs0o(F = 3) - P  oo(F = 3)[ < 0.001. Denoting the optimal value of K by K*, the most
desirable property of Lemma 3 is that when K* _ 1, we get fK _ fK', and thus, K* can
be found by the following Theorem.
2O
Theorem 1 When K* _, 1, K* _ v/_W, where K is an arbitrary integer, 1 _: K < W.
Proof: From Lemma 3, we get PKI(F = f) ,_ PIr2(F = f),Vf. Thus, when K* _ 1,
we have fK _ fir,, or fir. can be found by applying Lemma 2 to an arbitrary K such
that P(f > fir) < •. Clearly, for a given e, fir _ ], VK :_ 1, where ] is some constant.
• -W
The cost function Z(t) to be minimized can be expressed as _n(K ÷ f_-). Since the
objective function is convex when K is continuous, the optimal solution of real-valued K's
is K I = _. Then, K* can be found by an exhaustive search in [K ! - $, K t + 6], where
5 is some constant yet to be found.
An example cost function Z(t) is plotted in Fig. 8. The curve shown in Fig. 8 is
g + fir[wj. It can be seen that the integral constraint on g and [_J causes the sawtooth
curve in [K - AK, K + AK], but has only a small impact on the global curve shape. In
this example, • = 10 -s, ¢ = 1.8, and thus fir = 10. Thus, K I = x/10 × 4 × 106 = 6324.5.
Through an exhaustive search, it is found that there are multiple optimal solutions, and
the one closest to K t is 6320. The discrepancy between the result obtained from Theorem 1
and the exact solution is due to the integral constraints on K and _. Thus, having found
g', the optimal solution can be easily found by K* = minK, [_J = However, from
a practical viewpoint, the difference between K _ and K* is less than 0.1 percent, and thus,
it is reasonable to use [K tJ as an optimal solution.
From the above example, we can see that even when CEMs have fault detection capa-
biUty only, the performance of Scherne_l is nearly thousand times better than voting on
every word. The performance will be further improved if CEMs also have fault recovery
capabilities, which is usually the case. Using the example shown in Fig. 8, W = 4 x 106 and
1 - Cc m 2 × 10 -v for SEC/DED codes, we get f_ = 1, and K* _ 2000, when • remains
the same (10-s).
Cost functionsfor systems with and without SEC/DED codes are plottedin Fig.9.
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When the memory access time is 500 nanoseconds, it takes 2 seconds for a channel to scan
main memory. The total re-alignment times for systems without CEMs is 11 seconds. On
the other hand, when a fault occurs in a QMR..CEM system, with a probability greater
than 1 - 10 -5, it will take less than 2.045 seconds to complete memory realignment.
5 Conclusion
The reliability of redundant computing systems used for ALS is analyzed and some
design issues are discussed. The concept of access set is used for the analysis of multiple
channel faults leading to system crash. When fault arrivals are independent and the system
is free of error propagation and latent faults, the probability of system crash due to multiple
channel faults is dictated primarily by component failure rates. It is shown that with the
state-of-the-art technology, the probability of system crash due to multiple channel faults
is insignificant even when the system size is fairly large.
The case study of ALS has shown that the chief cause of unreliability in large redundant
systems is the depletion of hardware resources (as a result of component failures), especially
when the system has a long mission time. It is worth mentioning that our evaluation of
the effectiveness of CEMs in the ALS is very conservative, because all transient faults
are assumed to be recoverable by either NMtL.CEM or conventional NMR systems. Since
transient faults are typically 10 times more frequent than permanent faults [8, 9], the
reliability improvement by using CEMs would be even greater when conventional systems
do not have perfect recovery capability for transient faults.
Although emerging new technologies continue to improve hardware reliability and per-
formance, they also stimulate new applications which require higher reliability and com-
puting power. Thus, as main memory is the most vulnerable system component for the
current technology, it is expected to be the reliability bottleneck in future computing sys-
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terns. Fortunately, the designof CEMsfor main memoryis very simple, and very high
fault coverage can be achieved with low overhead. For the example discussed in this report,
about 22% of the memory overhead was induced for each channel to embed SEC/DED codes
into its main memory. By contrast, adding channels or increasing redundancy will increase
overheads substantially more in the power, physical size and channel synchronization of the
system. Thus, embedding SEC/DED codes into main memory is a much more cost-effective
method to prolong the resource depletion time than adding more channels to the system.
Large main memory coupled with slack voters makes memory re-alignment very time-
consuming. Thus, memory re-alignment in a large system should be avoided whenever
possible. It is shown in this report that CEMs can dramatically reduce the need of memory
re-alignment, and can speed up the re-alignment process substantially.
Another serious threat to memory re-alignment is the propagation of errors. If error
propagation is not effectively prevented, the number of contaminated pages will increase
quickly, and thus, the number of pages needing to be re-aligned will increase quickly. Error
propagation can be prevented only when the system has very good error detection capability.
This is a matter of our future research.
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Appendix A: List of Symbols
AS i, u The i-th access set in the system. AS i is essentially a set of memory words
that will be accessed continuously by the CPU (active agent) for a period of
time. u is the size of access set.
fK,_ K is the number of recovery pages in the system, fg is an upper bound for
f, the number of faulty recovery pages, such that P(tr= > K + f_) < e.
M_ is the length of time that the active agent stays in ASk during its i th
visit to ASk.
Tft m is the number of access sets in the system.
N(t) = _ Ni(t), where Ni(t) is the number of the agent's visits to AS _ by
i=1
time t, and N(t) is the total number of visits to access sets by the active
agent during [0, t).
NMR_CEM
QMR
NMR-CEM is an N modular redundant system with CEMs embedded into
each channel. QMR is a quadruplex modular redundant system.
PN(t) Pc(Yi) is the probability of a channel becoming faulty during time interval
Y_. PN(t) is the probability of system crash caused by multiple channel faults
during time interval [0, t).
PK(F = f) PK(F = f) is the probability of f recovery pages becoming faulty when the
number of recovery pages is K, and PK(tr_ = K + fw) is the probability of
the re-alignment time = K + f_.
T_ is the time the i-th vote is held, Y/is the interval between Ti-1 and Ti.
V_ is the event that the active agent makes the k-th visit to AS i. S_ is the
moment the event V_ begins.
X_ is a random variable denoting the number of fault occurrences to AS i
during the agent's j-th visit to access sets.
25
Aa,Ap,A_,A._,Ao are the failureratesof an accessset,a processor(including
controllogics),interstage,RAM memory, and ROM memory ofeach channel
in the system, respectively.
Pf,_ Pr(F=/+I)/_!isthe ratiotestof PK(F=/) 'Pl = (e_ --1),where _ isthe product
ofmemory size(words),failurerateofa memory word, number ofredundant
channels,and the time t.
II, IIE
IIQ
HE and IIQ are the environmental and quality factors of a component, re-
spectively. Component failure rate is adjusted by A_ -- HE × IIQ × A.
f/i f/i is the i-th recovery page.
comp_
channelA
compu.ng
channel B
com_l_
channelC
computing
channel D
communicator
l ..... i_lilllliltlllllllll ........ i ....... illllll_II_llllllilllllllll]
Figure h The voting and communication network of computing channels in FTP.
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Figure 9: Cost functions of systems with and without recovery capabilities.
